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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA I Plaintiffs and Appellants, vs. \ Case No. 8024 
PEOPLES EINANCE & THRIFT I COMPANY, a corporation, et al Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The respondents agree with the statement of facts set 
out in appellants' brief with the additional fact that a second 
stipulation was entered into between the parties on February 
16, 1953, (R. 71-74), and the further fact that at the time 
of the entering into the stipulation of May 23, 1952, and Feb. 
16, 195 3, all the parties, including the plaintiffs, were present 
in court with their attorneys and said parties were consulted 
relative to the terms of said stipulation by their attorneys 
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prior to the entry of the same, and they acquiesced in and agreed 
to the terms of said stipulations prior to the entry of said 
stipulations. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The respondents will argue appellants' points in the order 
in which they appear in appellants' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE 
OF FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Appellant contends that Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law by the court mandatory before entry of any valid judgment. 
Respondent contends that the scope of Rule 52 (a) does not 
include the type of judgment at issue, and that if it did, the 
judgment is not ipso facto void, but is a valid and enforceable 
obligation. 
The scope of Rule 52 (a) is clearly defined in the first 
sentence of the same. 
Rule 52-Findings by the Court. 
" (a) Effect. In all actions ffied upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the courts shall, unless 
the same are waived, :find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct 
4 
6cl 
lu]l 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~·· 
the entry of the appropriate judgment, * * * (Emphasis 
added). 
The express wording of the rule includes only those ac-
tions "tried upon the facts." The reason for thus restricting 
the application of the rule becomes apparent when the pur-
pose of the rule is analyzed. However, suffice it to say that a 
judgment entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties is 
not the product of an action "tried upon the facts." Instead, 
a consent judgment (one entered for the purpose of executing 
a settlement or compromise of an action) is a contract of the 
parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded. 
It is not a judicial determination or a judgment of the court 
except in the sense that the court allows it to go upon the 
record and have the force and effect of a judgment. The only 
inquiry of the court is whether the parties have in fact agreed 
as to the terms of the judgment. 
(See: 49 C.J.S. 308 ( 1947)) 
31 Am. Jur. 105, 107 (1940)) 
3· Freeman, Judgments § 1350 ( 1925)) 
It is thus apparent that the scope of Rule 52 (a) does not 
include the consent judgment, as in such a case there has been 
no judicial inquiry into the facts of the controversy. The parties 
in the instant case stipulated to the terms of a compromise, 
but there was no agreed statement of facts. It is difficult to 
see how the court could find the facts even if it had attempted 
to, without a trial upon the merits. Since a determination of the 
facts of the controversy and conclusions of law drawn from 
such facts was not the basis of the judgment, any findings of 
fact in the same matter would not only be unnecessary, but 
objectionable. 
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This argument is more convincing in the light of the pur-
pose of the adoption of Rule 52 (a) . A leading commentary 
upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which the ]: 
Utah rules were adapted, says in regard to the federal rule: 
(Barron & Holtzoff 2 Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules 
Edition, 809) 
The purpose of Rule 52 (a) is to aid the appellate 
court by affording it a clear understanding of the 
ground or basis of the decision of the trial court. 
Interpreting this rule, the court, in United States v. Institute 
of Carpet Manufacturers of America, ( 1 F.R.D. 636 (Dist. 
Ct. S. D.) stated: 
The apparent reason for the adoption of the rule 
in question was so that an appellate court might be in-
formed on the grounds for the decision rendered by 
the court from which the appeal was taken. The rule 
is intended to aid the appellate court by affording a 
clear understanding of the basis of the decision of the 
trial court. (Citing cases). 
and citing Goodacre v. Panagopoulos, (72 App. D. C. 25, 
110 F. 2d 377, 382) 
Like its predecessor, Equity Rule 70:Yz, Rule 52 (a) 
is intended to aid appellate courts by affording them 
a clear understanding of the basis of the decision below. 
We have held that, when this clear understanding is 
afforded, the judgment may stand although the rule 
is violated. 
This statement by one of our Federal District Courts is even 
more significant when one realizes that there is not even a pro-
vision for waiver of findings and conclusions in the federal 
rules, as there is in the Utah rules. 
6 
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Our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Wade in 
Mower v. McCarthy, (245 P. 2d 224), casts some light upon 
the purpose of the rule at issue: (Pgs. 226, 227) 
In every case involving disputed issues of fact, find-
ings of such facts are helpful to the reviewing court 
and should be made when requested and findings 
which meet the approval of the trier of facts are 
purposed. 
The judgment in the instant case was entered pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties, and the judgment itself so indicates 
(R. 53). There was no trial upon the facts by the trial court. 
There was no finding of fact which was made by the trial 
court, or which could have been made in light of the stipula-
tion. It is clear that the basis of the decision of the trial court 
was the stipulation, and findings of fact would serve no pur-
pose at all in clarifying for an appellate court the basis of the 
decision. Findings have weight with the appellate court when 
they represent the trial court's appraisal of the candor and 
credibility of witnesses and are based upon oral testimony. 
In this case, even if there had been such testimony, it could 
not have been relevant because the parties stipulated to a 
settlement. The judgment was entered only after two appear-
ancs of the parties in open court, and a mutual agreement as 
to the terms of settlement of the dispute. There were no wit-
nesses called, no documentary evidence presented for the court 
to pass upon, and no testimony whatsoever to be appraised by 
the trier of facts. 
~ It is elementary that when a judgment is based upon an 
agreement of the parties there are no material issues to be 
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decided by the trial court. Further, even in contested matters 
tried upon the facts, the failure to make findings upon im-
material issues, or issues which would not affect the judgment 
of the court is not ground for reversal. (Sheppick v. Sheppick 
ct al., 44 Utah 131, 138 P. 1169). 
Appellant cites two Utah cases to support his argument 
that the judgment is without validity because of the absence 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The first of these, 
Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 532, 26 P. 2d 328 (19}3)) was 
tried on the facts wilthout a jury. The court in holding that 
it was error for the trial court to fail to make findings on a 
matter at issue affirmed the familiar rule that "findings must 
respond to, and cover, the matter at issue raised by the plead-
ings." Justice Folland did not say that in a case where there 
are no material issues for the court to decide because of a 
stipulation of the parties, the judgment will be void without 
written findings of fact. The second case cited by appellant 
is likewise distinguishable in that it was an appeal from a 
decision after a trial including the presentation of evidence 
and testimony. 
Our Supreme Court has recognized that findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are not an essential to every valid 
judgment. In Young v. Ellett, ( 146 P. 2d 196) the court said 
(at page 198): 
"There are final judgments where no findings of fact 
or conclusions of law need or can be made ... There 
are others in which the record is complete and no find-
ings c~~ld be made other than those found in the 
record. 
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In the same opinoin, Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe said (Concurring 
at Page 199) : 
"If a judgment is not supported by findings and 
conclusions, it would seem that it should nevertheless 
be good as against collateral attack and capable of en-
forcement despite what was said in Hillyard v. District 
Court, 68 Utah 220, 249 P. 806. It would seem that a 
judgment would be void only where there was no power 
to render it." 
II~ Again, in Wright v. Union Pacific RR Co., (22 Utah 
~= 3 38, 62 P. 3 72) the Court indicated that findings of fact 
J:. are required only in a trial on the merits. Baird v. Upper 
::: Canal Irrigation Company (75 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060) limits 
::: the requirements of findings to "contested cases." 
n: 
The Federal District Court for the Southern District was 
confronted with substantially the same problem in United 
States v. Institute of Carpet Manufacturers of America, supra, 
as is now before this court. The parties to the suit had stipulated 
to a settlement of their dispute. The case came before the 
court on an application for the entry of a decree on the stipu-
lation. In granting the application, the court pointed out that 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court were not 
essential pre-requisites to· the entry of a valid judgment. 
A "Trial" is a judicial examination of the issues. 
( 42 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, 482, 533). 
In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Gold-
stein, ( 43 F. Supp. 767 (1942) the court said with regard to 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules (Pg. 768): 
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"This rule provides that findings be made by the 
~ourt in ~ll actions "tried" upon the facts without a 
~ury. ~htle summary judgment may dispose of all the 
~ssues m the action, the proceedings upon which it 
ts based cannot be regarded as a trial, nor are the 
issues "tried"." 
Again, in Pen-Ken Oil & Gas Corporation v. Warfield 
Natural Gas Co., 2 F.R.D. 355 ( 1942) the court stated (Pg. 
355}: 
"In my opinion Rule 52 applies to a case upon final 
hearing and submission. The ruling here is not made 
on the case upon final submission on the law and facts. 
The ruling here is on defendant's motion for summary 
judgment." 
This court is not hampered in its ability to appraise the 
judgment of the trial court by absence of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The basis of the judgment is clear. This 
appeal is not taken from the trial court's decision of the facts. 
This court would be in no manner aided in making a decision 
on this appeal by findings and conclusions. No right of the 
appellant had been infringed as a result of the trial court's 
failure to find specifically the facts on each issue that might 
have been raised had the case gone to trial. Further, applica-
tions of the rule of negative implication, a common principle 
of statutory construction, excludes the possibility that Rule 52 
(a) is designed to require findings and conclusions in cases 
which are not tried upon the facts. 
Since there is no necessity for findings and conclusions, 
in the instant case, it is immaterial whether there was a waiver 
of the same as provided for in Rule 52 (a). 
10 
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POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT VOID BECAUSE 
THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED UPON STIPULATION 
AND THERE WAS NO NECESSITY FOR A PRE TRIAL 
ORDER, AND SAID JUDGMENT IS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH SAID STIPULATION. 
The purpose of the rule directing the trial court to enter 
a pre-trial order is apparent. A trial court may eliminate un-
necessary issues, analyze and settle the pleadings by amend-
ments, eliminate matters of proof by admissions and stipula-
tions, etc. The pre trial order is to designate the results of the 
conference and direct the subsequent conduct of the trial. 
Appellant properly states the purpose of the order as being 
a guide to the parties. 
However, it cannot be honestly argued that the court is 
without power to enter a judgment at the close of a pre trial 
conference. (This point is too well established to require 
citation of cases) . In this event then, what is left to be the 
subject of a further order? The judgment in the instant case 
certainly did not leave the parties in a position to argue over 
the meaning of the stipulation. The terms of the judgment 
are clear and understandable. The court directed each party 
to respond in the manner that they had agreed to in their 
stipulations. Whether the decree of the court is called a judg-
ment or a pre trial order or a brown horse is not significant 
It is enough to say that it included all of the results of the pre 
trial conference, and directed the settlement of the controversy. 
It is difficult to see the point of appellants' argument that 
the stipulation was never meant to be the basis of a pre trial 
11 
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order or of a judgment. The appellate court might well ask 
why the parties went to the trouble of making a stipulation in 
open court if it were not their intent to make a final settlement 
of the dispute and have it a matter of judicial record with the 
force and effect of a judgment. It would have been a simple 
matter for all of the parties to the action to make a settlement 
out of court if they had never intended that their agreement 
be given the status of a court order. 
Appellant's argument that it was the intention of all of 
the parties and the court that the only action by the court would 
be the granting of the "petition to dismiss" the action comes 
as a surprise to the other parties. This argument, which is 
raised for the first time on appeal, has little weight in light 
of the chain of events preceding the final judgment. 
The Johnsons point out the language of the court (R. 46) 
as an indication that the stipulation was never intended to 
become part of an order of the court. It is a matter of record 
that the judgment was entered only after a second hearing 
of the parties (R. 71-74) on the objections to the proposed 
judgment, and a further stipulation which at the time settled 
all differences of the parties. Appellants later moved to set 
aside this stipulation, not on the grounds that the stipulation 
was ambiguous or indefinite, but that it was entered into im-
providently, inadvertently and mistakenly. Only after two 
hearings, and two stipulations did the court sign the judg-
ment embodying the terms of the agreement. There was cer-
tainly no question in the mind of the court as to the intent of 
the parties. 
Appellants next argue that the judgment entered does 
12 
:DI 
::o: 
l:ll 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.;r' 
not conform with the stipulation. The only fact argued in 
appellant's brief to support this point is that Paragraph 2 
(R. 54) of the judgment provides for a conveyance by plain-
tiffs of part of their land by Warranty Deed and a contract 
of sale for tlre balance. Appellant then states that where the 
court can find this in the stipulation is beyond comprehension. 
An examination of the judgment shows that plaintiff is to 
convey by Warranty Deed to defendant Finlayson certain de-
scribed land. Paragraph 1 of the judgment (R. 53) provides 
that the balance is to be the subject of a uniform real estate 
contract with plaintiff as seller and defendant Finlayson as 
buyer. One need only read the stipulation to comprehend that 
the following was part of the stipulation (R. 44, 45) : 
MR. BACKMAN: The Plaintiffs Arthur Johnson 
and Eva Johnson, his wife, allow Ebba E. Finlayson 
a claim of One Thousand Dollars on the uniform real 
estate contract and will convey to Ebba Finlayson the 
property west of the Fassie tract-isn't that it? 
MR. BAYLE: Yes, straight west. 
MR. BACKMAN: . . . running the full depth of 
the property, and a new contract will then be entered 
into with Ebba Finlayson describing the balance of the 
property within the fence lines. 
The property described in paragraph 2 (R. 54) of the judg-
ment is the property west of the Fassie tract. Paragraph 1 (R. 
53) of the judgment describes the balance of the Johnsons' 
property which was to be the subject of a real estate contract 
as provided for in the stipulation. It is unfair to the trial 
court to state that it is beyond comprehension where he could 
find this part of the judgment in the stipulation. 
13 
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POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ~ 
VACATE THE STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE :~ 
PRE TRIAL HEARING ON MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAIL-
ING TO SET THE ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL. -
The plaintiff contends that the court abused its discre-
tion in failing to vacate the stipulation entered into May 23, 
1952. The only evidence to support such a contention is a self-
serving affidavit signed on March 4, 1953 (R. 51-52). The 
court will note that the plaintiff delayed making such a con-
tention for a period of more than nine months after the stipu-
lation was entered into. Upon notice of objection to the entry 
of judgment, a second stipulation was entered into between 
the parties on February 16, 1953 (R. 71-74) and plaintiff 
raises no objection to this stipulation. 
The affidavit raises six ( 6) objections: 
( 1) That the description of the land should conform to 
the description as determined by George W. Cassidy. There is 
nothing in the plaintiffs' pleading to indicate that such was 
to be the method of determining the description (R. 54). 
There is also no evidence presented by the plaintiff to show 
that the descriptions of the land do not conform to the survey 
made by George W. Cassidy. 
( 2) That the new contract would call for the same terms 
of payment as the old contract. The new contract does recite 
the same terms of payment as the old contract (R. 19 showing 
copy of old contract, and R. 54 showing payments under the 
judgment). 
14 
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( 3·) That plaintiffs 'attorney was not informed that plain-
tiffs were not in the chain of title as grantors of the property 
now in possession of Reid and Kartchner. The original action 
is to quiet title to the property described in plaintiffs' com-
plaint (R. 8-9) which included the tract of land now in pos-
session of Reid and Kartchner. In determining that plaintiff 
had an interest in said property, plaintiffs' attorney would 
of necessity have to determine that his client either was in 
the chain of title or had a paramount title because of adverse 
possession, purchase at tax sale, or for some use or title para-
mount to that of the defendants. Plaintiffs' attorney, at the 
time of commencement of the action, was also a licensed 
abstractor and certainly knew all of the facts pertaining to 
the titles of all the tracts of land involved. 
( 4) That the land held by Reid and Kartchner had not 
been held adversely against the plaintiffs. The defendants had 
no opportunity to prove their claims as the case was settled 
by stipulation of the attorneys for the various parties in court 
at which time all parties were present. 
( 5) That the amount to be received from Reid and 
Kartchner was disproportionate to the amount plaintiffs al-
lowed Finlayson. The determination of amounts was on an 
entirely different basis. The amount Kartchner and Reid were 
to pay was to reimburse plaintiff for taxes he had inadvertently 
paid on property owned by Reid and Kartchner. The amoun ~ 
of credit to Finlayson was for a shortage of land to which h~ 
was entitled under the terms of his contract and had no rela-
tion whatsoever to the amounts fixed for reimbursement by 
Reid and Kartchner. 
15 
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( 6) That plaintiff did not understand they were to convey 
any property to Finlayson. This part of the stipulation of May 
2 3, 195 2, was dictated by plaintiffs' attorney (R. A4-45), said 
stipulation being made at a time when the plaintiffs were 
p<:rsonally present in court and they were personally consulted 
prior to the making of said stipulation by their attorney. 
The stipulation was certain, unambiguous and fully con-
curred in after due deliberation by the attorneys for all the 
parties and its terms were never changed by further stipula-
tions, said second stipulation being an additional term for 
settlement of the issues between the parties. Said stipulation 
was in all respects fairly and fully made and agreed upon by 
all the parties to said action and should not be avoided by this 
court. 
Appellants have cited 50 American Jurisprudence, 614 
Paragraph 14, with respect to the granting of relief from stipu-
lation. The citation, among other things, recited: "That upon 
appeal, the determination of the trial court as to the propriety 
of granting such relief will not ordinarily be interfered with 
except where a manifest abuse of discretion is disclosed . . . 
Parties will not be relieved from stipulations in absence of a 
clear showing that the fact or facts stipulated are untrue, and 
then only when the application for such relief is seasonably 
made and good cause is shown for the granting of such relief." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of Warren vs. 
Dixon Ranch Company, 260 P.2d 741, recited the rule that 
the court on appeal will reverse the trial court, only where an 
abuse of its discretionary power is clearly shown. The appel-
lant has not shown nor has he attempted to sho\\7, that any 
16 
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of the facts contained in the stipulation were untrue, nor has 
he shown any facts indicating that the lower court was guilty 
of a manifest abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents contend that the judgment was entered into 
upon the full knowledge of all of the parties and their attor-
neys and after two lengthy discussions with the court, that all 
parties knew all of the facts contained therein and agreed to 
the stipulations prior to the time they were entered into. 
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
Attorneys for Respondents Andrew Reid et ux and 
Ebba Finlayson 
351 Union Pacific Annex Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorney for Respondents Francis B. Johnson, et ux 
Utah Oil Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DAVID H. BYBEE, 
Respondents A. R. Kartchner, et ux, 
Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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